Seizing Kharg Island: A Hypothetical U.S. Operation and Its Global Strategic Consequences
- Aleksandr Krol
- 3 days ago
- 4 min read
Seizing Kharg Island: A Hypothetical U.S. Operation Scenario and Its Global Implications for the Balance of Power
Introduction
Kharg Island (Kharg Island) remains the main export terminal for Iran, through which 90–95% of all Iranian oil passes. Despite the recent U.S. strikes on March 13–14, 2026, targeting military facilities on the island (mine storage, missile depots, air defense, and other military sites), the oil infrastructure (berths, pipelines, storage tanks holding 30–34 million barrels) was not damaged.
Exports continue: according to TankerTrackers and Kpler data, Iran is loading 1.1–1.7 million barrels per day (sometimes more), with tankers loading non-stop. The main flow is directed to China — more than 80–90% (up to 95% in some months), accounting for approximately 11–12% of China's seaborne crude imports. The oil travels through the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz (with special agreements for Iranian/Chinese/Indian tankers), the Indian Ocean, the Malacca Strait, and onward to eastern Chinese ports (Dongjiakou, Qingdao, Lanqiao, and other hubs).
In these circumstances, I believe that the United States may want to conduct an operation to seize this island in order to cut off Iran's ability to pressure the Strait of Hormuz. Thus, I assume that the United States could carry out even two operations: one to seize Kharg Island and another to introduce troops into the area of oil transportation and loading.
Hypothesis: Seizing Kharg as a Tool of Strategic Pressure
Seizing Kharg would give the United States control over Iran's oil flow to Asia, opening the way to pressure China — the main and almost sole major buyer of Iranian oil under the current partial blockade of the Strait for most vessels. The strategic goal of such an operation would be to force Iran into a peaceful agreement: abandonment of its nuclear program and cessation of support for proxy groups.
The deployment of approximately 2,500 Marines from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (31st MEU) plus about 2,500 sailors (total ~5,000 personnel) on the amphibious group with USS Tripoli in the Persian Gulf area creates a real option for such a limited amphibious operation. This is not a signal of a full-scale invasion, but it provides the capability for vessel protection, evacuation, raids, or even temporary control over key facilities.
Risks of Failure and Escalation
In the event of failure of such an operation (both the first on Kharg and the second — a pinpoint amphibious action against nuclear facilities), the United States could lose control over the region in the strategic perspective. This would create a threat to Middle Eastern countries — Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE — in terms of an Iranian military invasion aimed at replacing regimes with ones loyal to Tehran. As a consequence — strengthening of the Iran–China–Russia axis in the Central Asian region and the Middle East.
A strategic defeat of the United States is possible. In such a situation, other countries hosting U.S. military bases would come under existential threat. U.S. weakness would become the strength of China and Iran in the Middle East. A strategic failure of the United States would mean the failure of the Anaconda strategy (strangling the adversary through control of key arteries). There would be a shift in the balance of power, leading to an increase in regional conflicts.
Current U.S. Actions
The current actions of the United States, beyond the obvious goals (degrading Iran's military capabilities), are aimed at preventing even larger conflict hotspots. However, the problem is that the United States can rely primarily on its own forces and only partially on allied European forces. The latter are busy restoring their military potential to eliminate existential threats to themselves (the threat from Russia).
Moreover, European countries are wary of getting involved in the U.S.–Iran conflict for another reason — the Islamic factor in Europe itself. The Muslim population of Europe has increased, and with it its influence on the political life of countries. This creates a stalemate: on one hand, Europe must help the United States; on the other, it would trigger new waves of migration on itself (again via Turkey).
Conclusion: The Need for a Ground Operation and Drawing in New Participants
Hence the conclusion: the United States must launch a ground operation (jointly with Israel) to eliminate the artery feeding Iran and China. As a consequence — draw new participants into the conflict in order to distance itself from large-scale ground operations and control oil flows from the air and sea. In such a case, the war with Iran could shift into a phase of attrition (the Syrian scenario). Then there would be a continuation of the Anaconda strategy, but in a more intensive and aggressive form: economic strangulation + constant military pressure without full-scale occupation of Iran.
Seizing Kharg is not just a tactical move, but a potential turning point beyond which the conflict would enter a new phase. Success would give the United States a decisive advantage and leverage over China. Failure would mean strategic defeat and a redrawing of the regional order. The question is whether there is enough political will and resources to move from an air campaign to control over the key artery — without which the war risks dragging into a deadlock unfavorable to all sides.
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Disclaimer:
This content represents the personal analytical opinion of the author and is provided for informational purposes only. It does not constitute investment advice, financial recommendations, or an offer to buy or sell any financial instruments.
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